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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal enforcement of
the penal code when criminals invest in a specific class of avoidance activ-
ities termed dissembling activities (i.e. self-protection eﬀorts undertaken
by criminals to hedge their illegal gains in case of detection and arresta-
tion). We show that the penal law has two screening eﬀects: it separates
the population of potential criminals between those who commit the crime
and those who do not, and in the former group, between those who un-
dertake dissembling eﬀorts and those who do not. Then, we show that it
is never optimal to use less than the maximal fine in contrast to what may
occur with avoidance detection (i.e. eﬀorts undertaken in order to reduce
the probability of arrestation: Malik (1990)); and furthermore, that the
optimal penal code may imply overdeterrence. Finally, we show that any
reform of the penal code has ambiguous eﬀects when criminals undertake
dissembling activities which are a by-product of illegal activities, since in-
creasing the maximum possible fine may increase or decrease the number
of crimes committed and may increase or decrease the proportion of illegal
gains hedged by criminals.
Keywords: deterrence, avoidance detection, dissembling activities, op-
timal enforcement of law.
JEL Classification: D81, K42.
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1 Introduction
The canonical economic literature on crime and punishment initiated by Becker
(1968) has provided two classical results. On the one hand, the best trade-oﬀ
between probability and penalty is achieved when monetary penalties are set
to their maximum possible level, because fines are most of the time costless, al-
lowing the enforcement authority to set them as high as possible. On the other
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hand, it is not optimal to completely deter individuals from engaging in an ille-
gal activity, since for at least some individuals, the gains from engaging in the
proscribed activity may be sometimes larger than the external costs it imposes
on the rest of the society. The first result has prompted a large body of litera-
ture (see Garoupa (1997) or Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for surveys) discussing
cases where fines are costly resources for enforcers or for the criminals, hence
justifying that less than maximum fines be used. In contrast, the second result
is a common by-product of the former, and it has been shown that whenever
enforcement authorities have imperfect information about criminals’ activities
and/or their characteristics, the optimal design of the penal code allows some
level of underdeterrence to exist.
Following this line, we tackle in this note two commonly acknowledged re-
sults: on the one hand the fact that avoidance activities undertaken by criminals
are a major reason justifying the optimality of less than maximum fine (Malik
(1990), Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993)), and on the other hand, that such activ-
ities aggravate the issue of criminals’ underdeterrence (Sanchirico (2006)). In
contrast, we will prove first that for the specific class of avoidance activities that
we term dissembling activities, it is never optimal to use less than maximum
fines. Second, we will also show that public policies designed to prevent crim-
inal behavior may lead to overdeterrence, in the sense that some oﬀenders are
deterred from engaging in the illegal activity although their private benefit is
larger than the external cost they impose on the rest of the society.
Avoidance activities encompass various expenditures engaged by criminals
in order to reduce their exposure to the risk of punishment. It comprises in-
stalling radar detectors to avoid speeding tickets, lobbying politicians to relax
the enforcement of regulations, bribing an enforcement agent to let go free a cul-
prit, destroying or covering up incriminating evidences, or investing in long and
costly litigations and so on. Thus, we suggest a basic albeit more comprehensive
typology similar to the distinction made in the economics of insurance markets,
between self-protection and self-insurance. In fact, some avoidance activities are
undertaken in order to lower the probability of apprehension, conviction and/or
punishment. Typically, this is the case for example with radar detectors. Note
that such expenditures may be understood as self-protection investments from
the point of view of criminals (they are more specifically termed avoidance de-
tection by Sanchirico (2006)). But the rationale for others kind of avoidance
activities is in contrast to reduce the impact of the arrestation and punishment
on the wealth or welfare of the criminals: typically, it occurs when criminals are
strategically bankrupt or non solvable, as it is the case when they render non
seizable the benefits of the crime. In this case, it corresponds for the criminals
to a kind of self-insurance behavior that will be termed dissembling activities in
the paper.
In fact, the existing literature on avoidance activities focuses on the case of
detection avoidance. Sanchirico (2006) has recently suggested that it is a serious
limit to the eﬀectiveness of public policies in the area of crime deterrence. He
argues that it implies the unfortunate but unavoidable result that any increase
in public monitoring expenditures leads to an increase in criminals’ avoidance
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activities, which in turn has an adverse feedback eﬀect on the eﬀectiveness and
eﬃciency of public detection, thruly leading to a high level of underdeterrence.
Nevertheless, Sanchirico does not address the issue of the optimal probabil-
ity/fine trade-oﬀ. Such an analysis has been earlier provided by Malik (1990)
and Bebchuk and Kaplow (1992) who have shown that avoidance detection may
justify that less than maximum fines are optimal1. Here, we focus on dissem-
bling activities, assuming that criminals’ investments in order to avoid the risk
of punishment enable them to hedge their illegal benefits in case of arrestation,
allowing the enforcer to seize only a small amount of those outcomes.
Section 2 describes the basic set up used in the paper, and proves that the
penal code has two diﬀerent screening eﬀects: on the one hand, it separates the
population of oﬀenders between those who commit the crime and those who do
not; on the other, it also distinguishes among the active criminals between those
who undertake dissembling eﬀorts and those who do not. In section 3, we show
that the beckerian result, namely the optimality of maximum fines, still holds
here. However, and in contrast to what occurs both in Becker’s paper or in Ma-
lik’s paper, overdeterrence may now occur at the optimum. Section 4 focuses on
the eﬀectiveness of public interventions. We first show that monetary penalties
and the probability of control may be either substitutable or complementary
instruments. This implies that when enforcement policies become more repres-
sive, criminals may take countervailing decisions which result in more crimes,
more individuals making dissembling eﬀorts and saving a larger proportion of
their illegal benefits in case of arrestation. Finally, this means that the reform
of the penal code has ambiguous eﬀects on criminality: in the situation where
underdeterrence exists at the optimum, the distortion from the first best may
be reduced as the maximal level of fine increases (for example, with the seizable
wealth or assets of criminals) since the optimal level of deterrence goes closer to
the external cost of crimes: public policies become thus more eﬃcient. On the
contrary, in the case where overdeterrence occurs at optimum, then the distor-
tion with respect to the first best may be aggravated as the maximal possible
fine is raised, making the level of deterrence closer to full deterrence. Section 5
briefly concludes.
2 Criminals’ behavior
Let us consider the case where the illegal activity allows the (risk neutral) crim-
inal to obtain a benefit equal to b (and b = 0 if the illegal act is not undertaken)
which will be called the type of the criminal. Public authorities do not observe
the type b. They just know that b is distributed according to a uniform dis-
tribution function on [0, B]. On the other hand, the (external) loss to the rest
of the society is D < B in case of crime, whatever the private benefit for the
criminal2 . We consider here that public enforcers are endowed with two basic
1See also Nussim and Tabbach (2006).
2Thus as usual in the literature, the first best level of deterrence corresponds to the illegal
benefit b = D (assuming it can be obtained at a small enforcement cost). Given that the type
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instruments, as is usual in the literature: monetary sanctions (penalty or fine)
f > 0, and expenditures in the monitoring of criminals’ behavior, defined for
the sake of simplicity as the choice of a probability of control p (encompassing
arrestation, conviction and punishment for an illegal behavior).
When he is caught, the oﬀender has to pay the fine but the protective mea-
sures undertaken ex ante allow him to save only the fraction β(x) ∈]0, 1[ of
his benefit b; x denotes the eﬀort in the dissembling activity (caution) and we
assume that β(0) = 0, β0 > 0, β00 < 0. Furthermore, we assume that the mone-
tary equivalent of the disutility cost of criminal’s eﬀorts is simply v(x) = x.The
maximum expected benefit obtained by the criminal when he undertakes the
illegal activity and makes the avoidance eﬀort is equal to:
u ≡ max
x
(π(x, p)b− pf − x) (1)
with π(x, p) = 1− p+ pβ(x), which may be understood as the ex ante total
proportion of the illegal benefit saved by the oﬀender3. The individually optimal
behavior of a criminal is described by the following proposition, denoting xˆ the
eﬃcient level of eﬀort4:
Proposition 1 The population of criminals separates in three diﬀerent groups,
defined according to two diﬀerent thresholds of the benefits labelled b¯ and b∗,
such that:
i) if the criminal’s type is b ∈ [0, b¯], then he does not commit the crime and
makes no dissembling eﬀorts (xˆ = 0);
ii) if the criminal’s type is b ∈]b¯, b∗], then he does commit the crime but
without undertaking any dissembling eﬀort (xˆ = 0);
iii) if the criminal’s type is b ∈]b∗, B], then he does commit the crime and
undertakes a positive level of eﬀort (xˆ > 0) which satisfies:
pβ0(xˆ)b = 1 (2)
Proposition 1 means that any enforcement policy has in fact two distinct
screening eﬀects on the population of potential criminals. On the one hand, it
leeds to the separation between those who become active criminals, and those
who are deterred - this a basic eﬀect. The threshold b¯ ≡ p1−pf corresponds
to the level of deterrence under which no crime is committed (this threshold
increases both with f and p). But there exists a second eﬀect: among the
active oﬀenders, some of them will also invest in dissembling activities (make
some eﬀorts to hedge their benefits in case of arrestation), while the others will
not. Namely, b∗ ≡ 1
pβ0(0) is the threshold over which any crime committed is
accompanied by an eﬀort in dissembling activities (and it decreases with p but
of the criminals is not observable, it is generally never attainable.
3With probability 1 − p, the criminal saves the benefit b in proportion 1, although with
probability p he saves only β(x) < 1.
4All the proofs are in the appendix.
4
is independant of f). It is easy to see5 that for any b ∈]b∗, B], the optimal xˆ is
unambiguously increasing with p and b, but is independent from the fine. The
value of the fine f matters only in the sense that it influences the decision to
engage in the illegal activity or not, although it does not aﬀect the decision to
undertake or not the avoidance expenditures.
The rest of the paper studies the eﬀects of the optimal enforcement of the
law on this specific structure of the population of criminals.
3 Second best policies
The management costs associated with the monetary penalty are neglectable,
but monitoring the criminal activity entails a cost equal to m(p), with m0 > 0
and m00 > 0. The government has to choose a fine f and a probability of control
p in order to maximize the social welfare function:
S =
1
B
Z b∗
b¯
((1− p)b−D)db+ 1
B
Z B
b∗
(π(x(p, b), p)b− x(p, b)−D)db−m(p)
under the constraint6 f ≤ F . The two first (integral) terms in S correspond to
the expected private benefit associated with the illegal activity (the benefit of
the criminal without dissembling eﬀorts minus the external cost, plus his benefit
when he commits the crime with an positive eﬀort minus the cost of dissembling
and the cost to the society). The last one is the cost of monitoring for public
authorities. The fine is a mere transfer between the (risk neutral) criminal and
the government, it does not appear in the social welfare function (it is not worth
from a social point of view). It is obvious (see also Malik (1990)) that for small
values of the external cost of crime and/or large values of the public cost of
monitoring, the solution of this problem may be zero deterrence; and under
the opposite conditions (large values of the external cost of crime and/or small
values of the public cost of monitoring), we may obtain complete deterrence.
Thus, we focus rather on the more powerful case with conditional deterrence
hereafter.
If an interior solution (p, f) exists, it satisfies the first order conditions of
maximization which are written:
1
B
(D − pf) b¯
p(1− p) = m
0 +
1
B
"µ
x∗ − β
∗
β0(0)
¶
b∗
p
+
Z b∗
b¯
bdb+
Z B
b∗
(1− βˆ)bdb
#
(3)
5Applying the implicit function theorem to (2), one obtains: ∂xˆ
∂p
= β
0(xˆ)
−β00(xˆ)p > 0 and
∂xˆ
∂b
=
β0(xˆ)
−β00(xˆ)b > 0.
6This is the most natural specification when we consider that the cost of avoidance cor-
responds to the disutility of criminals’ eﬀorts, and F corresponds to the seizable wealth or
assets of criminals.
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1B
(D − pf) p
1− p = λ (4)
with λ = 0 if f < F but λ > 0 otherwise, and denoting β∗ = β(x∗), βˆ = β(xˆ).
More specifically, the LHS in (3) is the social marginal benefit from the control
of illegal activities, while the RHS corresponds to the social marginal cost of
controling which takes into account the enforcer’s marginal cost of monitoring
(first term) and the criminals’ marginal cost of dissembling eﬀort (last three
terms). Similarly, the LHS in (4) is the social marginal benefit of fines, and the
the RHS is their social maginal cost (which is simply the shadow price of the
constraint, since fines are costless). In the appendix, we prove that the following
results hold:
Proposition 2 The solution with conditional deterrence has the following prop-
erties:
i) The maximum fine f = F is always optimal, and the probability p must
be set as small as possible according to (3).
ii) We obtain that pF < D and there may exist either over or underdeter-
rence at optimum (b¯ ≡ p1−pF ≷ D).
Result i) is in contrast to the one obtained by Malik (1990) in the case of
detection avoidance i.e. when avoidance activities enable criminals to lower the
probability of arrestation and punishment: whereas less than maximum fine
may be optimal under detection avoidance, this never occurs under dissembling
activities. These two diﬀerent results are easily explained. Under dissembling
activities, criminals eﬀort are independent of the fine: raising the fine entails
no additional costs on criminals (beyond the expected fine paid in case of ar-
restation), and thus has only the direct eﬀect on deterrence. Hence, insuﬃcient
deterrence obtaines unless maximum fines are set. In contrast, with detection
avoidance (Malik (1990)), the fines impose a private cost on criminals, over
the expected fine paid in case of arrestation; depending on whether avoidance
expenditures become more or less sensitive to the fine, then the enforcement
autorities may use less than maximum fine or not.
Part ii) also challenges the usual result of the literature. In the canonical
model of Becker, there is not enough deterrence at the optimum: some of the
criminals for which the benefit of committing the crime is smaller than the
external cost on the society, are not deterred. This is explained by the fact that
the level of deterrence corresponds to the expected fine paid by criminals when
they are arrested - and random detection is justified by the costly resources used
to control criminal activities. In contrast, in the present set up the expected
fine is always smaller than the external cost of crime but does not determine the
level of deterrence: this latter is set at a threshold high enough to deter only
those in the population of criminals who would never engage in dissembling
activities; but on the other hand, as far as it is socially worth to deter also some
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of the active criminals who do make an eﬀort (as soon as their benefit is lower
than D), it may be necessary to set the probability of control at a high level
given that these individuals are not sensitive to the level of the fine. As a result,
the probability may be sometimes set at a level high enough to induce excessive
deterrence at optimum. But depending on the properties both of the disutility
cost of eﬀort and of the technology of dissembling (see the three last terms in
the RHS of (3)), the opposite result of underdeterrence may arise, as usually
found both by Becker (1968), as well as Malik (1990) or Sanchirico (2006) under
detection avoidance.
Note that it could be possible also that the first best level of crimes occurs
(by chance). Nevertheless, in such a case, due to the asymmetric information the
penal code always imposes an excessive cost to the society: among the criminals
who are not deterred, some do make a dissembling eﬀort although their activity
is valuable (i.e. they would never be punished if their type were observable),
and the distulity cost of their eﬀort reduces the social welfare.
Finally, proposition 2 implies that although maximum fines are always op-
timal, they have an ambiguous eﬀect on the number of crimes committed when
criminals’ type is not observable, and when some of them invest in dissembling
activities. In the following, we investigate the consequences of this result more
deeply.
4 Countervailing behaviors of repressive policies
As proven by Garoupa (2001), although the canonical result of Becker is usu-
ally understood as establishing the substituability between both instruments,
this is not necessarily true. Let us focus here on the degree of substitutabil-
ity/complementarity between fines and controls, i.e. whether the optimal prob-
ability decreases or increases with the maximum fine in the presence of dissem-
bling activities. Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) with f = F , it is
easy to verify that sign dp
dF
= signSpF with:
SpF =
1
B
D − 2pF
(1− p)2
(5)
Hence the following result is straightforward:
Proposition 3 When the fine increases, the optimal probability of control may
either decrease or increase.
This is essentially the same result as the one obtained in the canonical model
without avoidance activity; see Garoupa (2001) for a more detailed discussion
of its intuitive meaning: when the maximal fine is high, the level of deterrence is
also high (and there may exist overdeterrence); thus, raising F , the enforcer has
the opportunity to decrease the probability in order to reduce the enforcements
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costs. In contrast, when the maximal fine is small (to the limit, close to zero),
the level of deterrence is also small, and it may be worth in this case to raise
both F and the probability in order to reach enough deterrence.
This first finding has several implications. The next proposition focuses on
the impact of the monetary sanctions on the distorsion to the first best number of
crimes, on the number of criminals undertaking an eﬀort and on the proportion
of illegal benefits they can save in case of detection.
Proposition 4 An increase in the maximum fine yields:
i) an increase in the level of deterrence b¯ when the probability and the fine
are complements, but an ambiguous eﬀect when they are substitutes.
ii) a decrease in the number of active criminals undertaking dissembling
eﬀorts b∗− b¯, if the probability and the fine are complements, but an ambiguous
eﬀect if they are substitutes.
The ambiguity in part i) of proposition 4 is easily explained by the fact
that an increase in F has a direct eﬀect on b¯ which is always positive, but also
an indirect eﬀect through the variation of p which is positive when p and F
are supposed to be complementary, but negative when they are substitutable:
thus, the total eﬀect depends on whether the first or the second one dominates.
The indirect eﬀect also holds in part ii) since the threshold b∗ does not directly
depend on F but is sensitive only to the fequency of control.
An obvious implication of proposition 4 is that it is very uncertain whether
the enforcement authority has the opportunity to reach a fine tuning of the
level of criminality when criminals invest in dissembling activities. In fact, the
following results generally hold:
Corollary 5 An increase in the maximum fine:
i) always yields a decrease (respectively, an increase) in the level of under-
deterrence (overdeterrence) when the probability and the fine are complements
at the optimum, whereas the eﬀect is ambiguous when they are substitutes.
ii) has no eﬀect on the benefits saved by the marginal criminal b∗.
iii) implies a decrease (an increase) in the benefits saved by any criminal b >
b∗ when the probability and the fine are substitutes (respectively complements).
Notice first that the ambiguity in i) arises only when the probability and the
fine are substitutes. Secondly, when the probability and the fine are comple-
ments, increasing the sanction has favorable eﬀects in case of underdeterrence,
but adverse ones in case of overdeterrence. When underdeterrence occurs at
the optimum, then the optimal level of deterrence goes closer to the external
cost of crimes as the maximum fine grows up; in other words, the distortion to
the first best level of deterrence is reduced, and public policies become more
eﬃcient. On the contrary, when overdeterrence occurs at the optimum, then
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the distortion with respect to the first best increases as the maximum fine is
raised, making the level of deterrence closer to full deterrence.
Concerning ii) and iii), the results reflect that the proportion βˆ for any b ≥ b∗
do not directly depend on F but is sensitive only to the fequency of control.
Thus for part ii), the increase in the fine has two indirect but opposite eﬀects on
the marginal criminal b∗ through its dissembling eﬀorts: one on the probability
of control, the other on the illegal benefit b∗, but given that they have the same
magnitude, the net eﬀect is nul. In contrast, in iii) for any b > b∗ the eﬀect is
simply the one associated to the probability of control.
5 Final remarks
This paper provides a diﬀerent view on the eﬀects of the penal code when crim-
inals have the opportunity to undertake avoidance activities. We have modified
Malik (1990)’s model to incorporate a continuum of criminals and we assume
that those criminals have the opportunity to invest in dissembling activities
which allow them to hedge the benefits of the crime when they are arrested and
punished (prevent that illegal assets be seized by the enforcer). In this set up,
we show that the adoption by criminals of such self-protective measures has ma-
jor consequences: specifically, we show that maximum fines are always optimal,
and that overdeterrence may be optimal. This diﬀers from the results previously
obtained by Malik (1990) or Sanchirico (2006): avoidance activities are usually
expected to justify the use of less than maximum fines, and to aggravate the
problem of underdeterrence which initially appeared in the canonical world à la
Becker.
More generally, it also challenges the common view which is to condition the
design of law enforcement on the seizable wealth of criminals since the maximal
possible fine is commonly interpreted as the individual wealth of criminals. For
example, Garoupa (2001) concluded that the optimal probability is an inversed
U-shaped function in criminals’ wealth (both small and large criminals face a low
probability of sanction) when wealth is a public information (observable before
detection and prosecution). In contrast, when wealth is a private information
(Polinsky and Shavell (1991)), the optimal probability is U-shaped with respect
to criminal’s wealth (both small and large criminals face a large probability of
sanction). Our results suggest that in the presence of dissembling expenditures,
which are an unavoidable by-product of illegal activities, things are less clear,
and more restrictive policies may have counterintuitive and/or adverse eﬀects.
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APPENDIX
Proof of proposition 1
Remark first that there exist at least some values of b ∈]0, B] such that:
pβ0(0)b − 1 ≤ 0 ⇔ b ≤ b∗ ≡ 1
pβ0(0) : then it is individually eﬃcient for such
criminals to make no dissembling eﬀorts otherwise their expected benefit would
be decreasing with x. Thus, for any criminal of type b ≤ b∗ there are two
possibilities:
A/ either the condition (1 − p)b − pf ≤ 0 ⇔ b ≤ b¯ ≡ p1−pf also holds and
the criminal does not enter into the illegal activity; this proves i);
B/ or b > b¯, and the criminal of type b ≤ b∗ commits the crime but chooses
a xˆ = 0. This proves ii).
On the other hand, for any b > b∗ if an interior solution xˆ > 0 exists, it must
satisfy (2) which is necessary and suﬃcient given the assumptions put on β.
Remark now that the associated u in (1) writes u = [(1− p)b− pf ]+pbβ(xˆ)− xˆ:
given that the first bracketed term is positive as soon as b > b¯, while the second
one is also positive for any b > b∗ since β(x) is increasing and concave, then it
is obvious that any criminal b > b∗ engages in the illegal activity and makes a
positive eﬀort in the dissembling activity. This proves iii).
Proof of proposition 2
i) Let us consider a solution where the optimal fine satisfies f < F . Accord-
ing to (4), this implies that pf = D and thus for any positive probability we
obtain
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Sp = −m0 −
1
B
"µ
x∗ − β
∗
β0(0)
¶
b∗
p
+
Z b∗
b¯
bdb+
Z B
b∗
(1− βˆ)bdb
#
< 0
since according to the concavity property: x∗ − β
∗
β0(0) > 0, which is a con-
tradiction to the assumption that it is optimal to control. As a result f = F
is optimal, and p must be set as low as possible according to the condition (3).
It is easy to verify that the second order condition is satisfied as long as m has
enough decreasing returns to scale (left to the reader).
ii) Finally, given that the RHS of (4) is positive, it must be that D > pF .
Hence, there may exist either over or underdeterrence at optimum, given that
b¯ ≡ p1−pF ≷ D.
Proof of proposition 4
It is straightforward to show that:
db¯
dF
=
p
1− p −
F
(1− p)2
SpF
Spp
where dp
dF
= −SpF
Spp
, with SpF > 0 when p and F are complements, but
SpF < 0 when p and F are substitutes. Spp is negative (by the second order
condition) but has several terms either positive or negative since the private
marginal cost of eﬀort in (3) is not monotonic in p (left to the reader), such that
FSpF − p(1− p)Spp ≶ 0. Hence the result i).
The impact on the diﬀerence b∗ − b¯ is:
d
dF
(b∗ − b¯) = − p
1− p −
µ
1
p2β0(0)
+
F
(1− p)2
¶
dp
dF
which is negative if dp
dF
> 0 but has an ambiguous sign otherwise. This is
result ii).
Proof of corollary 5
At the threshold b∗ we have:
dβ∗
dF
= β∗
0 x∗
p
dp
dF
(ex
∗
p − ex
∗
b∗ )
where ex
∗
p ≡ ∂x
∗
∂p
p
x∗ =
β0(x∗)
−β00(x∗)x∗ = e
x∗
b∗ ≡ ∂x
∗
∂b∗
b∗
x∗ : hence
dβ∗
dF
= 0. This proves
ii).
But for any b > b∗, we have:
dβˆ
dF
= βˆ
0 xˆ
p
dp
dF
exˆp
which has the sign of dp
dF
. Hence the result iii).
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